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Farm-Level Evaluation of Alternative
Policy Approaches to Reduce Nitrate
Leaching from Midwest Agriculture
Scott M. Swinton and David S. Clark
Policies to reduce nitrate leaching are evaluated using a mixed integer linear programming
model of a representative Michigan cash grain farm. At spring 1993prices, elimination of the
current deficiency payment program is found to be more efficient at reducing leaching than a
nitrogen input tax, a tax credit on biologically fixed nitrogen, a rotation payment, or
obligatory use of the Integrated Farm Management Program Option (IFMPO). However,
elimination of the deficiency payment program would significantly reduce farm income.
Modeling risk management and nitrate leaching dynamics are useful extensions of this
research, as is estimating the benefits from averting nitrate leaching.
As policy makers plan for the next “farm bill” in
1995, a growing concern is how that legislation
will affect incentives to limit groundwater contam-
ination and to practice crop rotations that include
resource-conserving crops. Conversations with
farmers and publications in the popular press
(Cramer) suggest growing disaffection with the
current government deficiency payment program.
Academic research bears out the belief that despite
some innovation in the 1990 farm bill, the com-
modity price stabilization programs continue to
discourage rotations including resource-conserving
crops (RCC’S) (Diebel and Williams, Williams
and Diebel). While the federal farm commodity
programs alone may lack enough leverage to trans-
form husbandry practices (Doering), they clearly
have a powerful incentive effect at the margin,
even as the financial benefits they offer diminish.
Public concern about groundwater contamina-
tion from nitrate leaching has been raised by its
status as the most widespread agriculturally-related
chemical appearing in groundwater samples, In re-
cent studies, more than 3% of wellwater samples
tested exceeded maximum contaminant level
(MCL) set by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (USGS) and many areas of the United
States have high potential for nitrate leaching
(Kellogg, Maizel and Goss). Nitrate ingestion has
been associated with methemoglobinemia or’ ‘blue
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baby syndrome, ” but only at levels far exceeding
the MCL of 10parts per million (Fan, Willhite and
Book). However, opinion research indicates that
consumers are wary of unavoidable risks, espe-
cially those involving children (Winter and Sie-
her). These factors have combined to make agri-
cultural nitrate management an issue in the upcom-
ing policy debate.
This paper reviews some recent analyses of U.S.
agricultural policy impacts on crop rotation adop-
tion and on nitrate leaching into groundwater. It
proceeds to examine a set of alternative policies in
the context of a representative Michigan cash crop
farm. These policies include the current (1990)
farm program provisions, complete abandonment
of the deficiency payment program, and variants of
these which include a nitrogen input tax, a subsidy
for biologically fixed nitrogen, and “quasi-
deficiency” payments for resource-conserving ro-
tational crops planted on base acreage.
Contemporary U.S. agricultural price and in-
come stabilization policy has become increasingly
complicated since its introduction in the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933. The overwhelming
focus of the “farm bills” since 1933 has been to
stabilize and support farm incomes. This has been
done chiefly through price supports and supply
control measures. The principal crops in the pro-
gram have been wheat, corn, oats, barley, sor-
ghum, rice, cotton, tobacco, and peanuts. Oilseeds
such as soybean, canola, and sunflower have re-
ceived more limited price supports in the form of
loan rate price floors (discussed below).
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paid a “deficiency payment” equal to the differ-
ence between a “target price” and the market
price for eligible crops. If the market price is be-
low a lower bound level known as the’ ‘loan rate,”
then the deficiency payment is the difference be-
tween the target price and the loan rate, and par-
ticipating farmers may obtain a non-recourse loan
from the U.S, Commodity Credit Corporation se-
cured by eligible grain stocks valued at the loan
rate. Eligible crops are those grown on the histor-
ical “acreage base” land where they had been
grown before the program came into being. That
land was required to continue to produce program
crops or permissible substitutes in order to remain
in the eligible “base.” Deficiency payments are
based on county average or five-year historical av-
erage yields (which have not been adjusted since
1985). In order to manage the supply of wheat and
feed grains, the government has required that some
of the base acreage be “set aside” from the grow-
ing of program crops under the Acreage Reduction
Program (ARP).
The Food Security Act of 1985 represented the
first time environmental objectives entered signif-
icantly into the commodity programs, The envi-
ronmental innovations in the 1985 bill focussed
chiefly on conservation measures. The two princi-
pal environmental programs were the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP), which allowed putting
highly erodible lands into longterm fallow, and the
requirement that farmers develop “conservation
compliance” plans for reducing soil erosion on
these highly erodibIe lands if they wished to con-
tinue participating in the commodity programs.
The bill introduced the opportunity to grow a non-
program crop on designated flexible or “flex”
acres without losing that part of the base acreage,
It also created the 50/92 program, which allowed
farmers to fallow program crop land on up to 50%
of base acres still be paid 92% of the deficiency
payments to which he or she would be entitled if
the crop had been grown.
The latest bill, called the “Food, Agriculture,
Conservation and Trade Act of 1990” (FACTA),
and related legislation in the “Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990” added to these provi-
sions additional “optional flex” acreage, extended
the 50/92 program to 100% of base acreage for
some crops (ergo, the new “0/92” name), and a
new program called the Integrated Farm Manage-
ment Program Option (IFMPO). This last allows
participating farmers to raise “resource-con-
serving crops” on at least 20% of their base acre-
age while receiving deficiency payments and re-
taining the associated base. Resource-conserving
crops include hay and small grain crops. However,
program crops such as wheat may not be harvested
(although oat harvest has been allowed), and hay
crops may not be harvested during five months of
the summer season. In the three years since its
inception, the IFMPO has been little used.
Resource-conserving Crops and the 1995
Farm Bill
The failure of the IFMPO is ironic, given its po-
tential to reduce agricultural nonpoint source water
pollution—both surface erosion and nitrate leach-
ing into groundwater. This comes at the same time
that congressional debate over reauthorization of
the Clean Water Act has refocused public attention
on nonpoint source pollution. Moreover, there is
emerging scientific evidence that crop diversity—
which is enhanced by rotations and cover crops—
can reduce nonpoint water pollution by improving
soil quality and tilth (Harwood). Improved soil
quality leads to faster infiltration of rainwater into
the soil, and more active soil microbial life. If
properly managed, the latter has the potential to
reduce necessary amendments of nitrogen fertil-
izer, with associated reductions in nitrate leaching.
Why is the IFMPO little used in spite of poten-
tial social benefits of resource-conserving crops?
Diebel and Williams found that its restrictions on
haying, grazing, and harvest for human consump-
tion made it less profitable than optional flex pro-
duction under northeastern Kansas conditions.
Subsequent research by Williams and Diebel indi-
cates that current programs discourage rotational
cropping, even taking into account the agronomic
value of nitrogen fixed by leguminous crops in
rotation. A farmer wishing to begin a rotation in-
cluding RCC’S may find flex acres the most eco-
nomical means to do so.
RCC’S under FACTA in Southeastern Michigan:
Results fkom an LP Model
Since enterprise profitability and government pro-
gram impacts vary considerably from one part of
the country to another, the FACTA program was
examined using mixed integer linear programming
(MILP) for a representative cash grain farm in
southern Michigan. MILP is helpful for capturing
the indivisibility requirements inherent in some
farm program provisions, and has been used pre-
viously for this purpose by Gillespie, Hatch and
Duffy and by Mires, Duffy and Young. For sim-
plicity, the present study assumes risk neutrality
and static optimization, so expected prices are68 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
fixed and both all crop growth and nutrient move-
ment occur in the same season.
The model was developed for a cash grain farm
with 500 acres of crop land representative of sandy
loam soils in southern Michigan. The farm opera-
tor’s obiective was assumed to be the maximiza-
tion of “farm gross margin, defined as returns to
unpaid family labor, management, capital, and
land. The farm, a modified version of one de-
scribed in Clark, was assumed to have 250 acres of
com acreage base, to practice conventional tillage,
and to have a labor force of one fulltime owner-
operator with the opportunity to hire added occa-
sional labor at $6.50 per hour. Farm workers were
assumed to work 10-hour days on the mean num-
ber of days suitable for fieldwork on a sandy loam
soil with weather typical of Bad Axe, Michigan
(Rosenberg et al.). Enterprises included 1)
monocrops of low-, medium- and high-yielding
corn, wheat, soybeans, oats, and canola, for which
prices, yields and variable costs are shown in Ta-
ble 1; 2) two RCC’s: oats followed by red clover
and wheat followed by red clover, and 3) rotations
of corn-corn-soy bean-oatlclover, corn-wheatl
clover-corn-oat/clover, and corn-corn-soybean-
wheat/clover (CCSW/Cl) (all with high corn
yields). The costs and yields of crop rotations were
based on those in Table 1, weighted by the impor-
tance of each crop enterprise in the rotation. The
cash grain farm was assumed to raise leguminous
hay crops only as cover or green manure crops.
For the 250 acres in the corn program base, the
model included commodity program rules for
1993, which call for 10% ARP set-aside acreage,
159i0normal (mandatory) flexible acreage, up to
10% optional flexible acreage, and the rest com
acreage eligible for deficiency payments (’‘pay-
ment acreage”). The model was developed as a
mixed integer model in order to accommodate the
requirement that IFMPO participation include at
least 20% of program acreage.
While the actual process of nitrate leaching is
Table 1. Crop Prices, Yields, and Variable
Costs Assumed for the Representative
Farm Model
Price Yield Variable Cost
Crop ($/Bushel) (Bushels/Acre) ($/Acre)
Canola 5.10 36 89
corn 2.03 120” 123
Oats 1.30 70 65
Soybean 5.60 40 90
Wheat 2.95 60 85
*Corn enterprises with yields of 80 and 100bushels/acre were
also included.
complex and affected by many uncontrolled, envi-
ronmental factors (Follett, Kenney and Cruse),
leaching was modeled here in a simplified fashion
that is intended only to be illustrative of how pol-
icy and leaching may interact. Forty percent of
applied mineral nitrogen fertilizer was assumed to
leach in nitrate form. Biologically fixed nitrogen
was assumed not to leach and all leaching was
assumed to occur in the year of fertilizer applica-
tion.
Market prices per bushel assumed in the model
were $2.03 for corn, $2.95 for wheat, $1.30 for
oats, $5.60 for soybean, and $5.10 for canola
(Gardner et al.), as shown in Table 1. Because the
assumed com price exceeds the 1993 loan rate of
$1.72, the latter value did not enter into deficiency
payment calculations. While these commodity
prices are low relative to inflation-adjusted historic
values, their relative magnitudes are close to his-
toric ratios (e.g., corn-soybean price ratio in
Huang and Uri). Variable costs and yield data were
obtained from Nott et al., while average enterprise
labor requirements for a highly mechanized farm
were obtained from Hinton (except for canola,
which was treated like wheat except for planting
by mid-September). Costs modeled included dry
(100%) nitrogen fertilizer at $0. 19/pound, anhy-
drous ammonia (82% nitrogen) at $0. 13/pound,
com drying at $0.03/bushel, and other variable
costs that do not change with fertility management
practices,
A condensed version of the 27 row by 66 col-
umn programming matrix is displayed in Table 2.
Plus signs denote positive values, while minus
signs denote negative ones. A similar, but much
simpler model with no integer constraints was used
to evaluate elimination of the commodity programs.
Under FACTA, the optimal solution included
the maximum amount of high-yield corn permitted
on base acres (187.5 acres) with soybeans on the
37.5 normal flex acres and 25 acres of set-aside
(ARP) land. Soybeans were grown on all non-base
acres, as shown in the first column of Table 3. The
total gross margin was $69,112, including $16,200
in deficiency payments. Total projected nitrate
leaching was 10,906 pounds.
As in Williams and Diebel’s results, it would be
costly to introduce rotations. The least expensive
way to introduce a rotation would be to grow com-
corn-soybean-wheat/clover, planting high-yield
com on com base payment acres at a private mar-
ginal cost of $11.67 per acre. Using IFMPO would
cost far more, since it would displace high-yield
com income at a marginal cost of $63.25 per acre
for oats followed by clover (with oats harvested).
This might more accurately be viewed as an incre-Swinton and Clark Policy Approaches to Reduce Nitrate Leaching 69
Table 2. Condensed Tableau for the Mixed Integer LJnearProgramming Model of a Michigan
Cash Grain Farm Under 1993 Commodity Profwams
Crop
Nor- Hue
Non mal Opt, IFMPO Set Buy Seas. Def, Sell Uach- N N Rot’n
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“Parenthesesdenote scenarios which varied across model runs.
bFallow or canola. 0/92 canola column contains comespondhg costs and yields.
‘Coefficients prorated for rotations including non-base acreage.
‘A very large number such that constraint is never limiting.
‘Nhrogen crerOtapplies only to crop rotations where nitrogen-fixinglegumes and nitrogen-retaining,small grams are included.
‘Applies to rotations only; coefficient is equal to proportion of rotation not in corn.
SIFMPGwheat not rdlowedto be sold under current progmm regulations; oata, bowever, may be sold.
mental opportunity cost of $3,162, since IFMPO
requires that a minimum 20% of base acres be
planted to resource-conserving crops. Under this
IFMPO enterprise mix, 9,211 lbs of nitrate leach-
ing was projected to occur.
Policy Alternatives to Encourage
Resource-conserving Crops
Various permutations of five alternative policies
were reviewed with the objective of maintaining
income levels while reducing nitrate leaching
through the adoption of crop rotations and RCC’S.
These policies included 1) a tax credit for nitrogen
predicted to be fixed biologically by rotational
crops, 2) a nitrogen fertilizer tax, 3) a “quasi-
deficiency” payment to the producer for each com
base payment acre planted in a rotation including
RCC’S, 4) permitting wheat to be harvested under
the IFMPO program, and 5) elimination of the cur-
rent deficiency payment program. A Pigouvian tax
on nitrate leaching, which has been reviewed else-
where (Johnson, Adams and Perry), was not in-
cluded due to the impracticality of its application.
The original enterprise mix under FACTA re-
mained optimal under a tax credit on biologically
fixed nitrogen up to 163% (3l@lb), a nitrogen in-
put tax up to 121% (23@/lb),and a rotational crop
quasi-deficiency payment up to $24.00 per acre
(roughly two-sevenths the value of the full $86.4070 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Crop Enterprise Acreage and Gross Margins for a Representative Southwest
Michigan Cash Grain Farm Under Alternative Policy Scenarios
FACTA W/121%
N Tax or 1637. No Rotation Payment
FACTA: Biol. N Credit or Commodity of $28.00 w/ no
Base Case $24 Rotation Payment Program Other Progrmn
Gross margin ($) 69,112 62,983 or 69,155 62,208 62,230
or 69,237
Nitrate leached (lbs) 10,906 10,550 4,000 7,273
Corn base acres
High yield com in CS rotation




Soybean in CS rotation
Soybean (continuous)
Corn in CCSW/Cl rotation
Soybean in CCSW/Cl rotation




















corn deficiency payment on the registered ASCS
yield of 120 bushels). Above these thresholds, all
three policies would result in switches from the
high-yield corn on com base payment acres (in
rotation with soybean on non-base acres) to the
high-yield corn part of the com-corn-soybean-
wheat/clover rotation on payment acres, as shown
in Table 3. Nitrate leaching would fall to 10,550
lbs, a 370 decrease from the FACTA base case.
Farm gross margins, however, would differ ac-
cording to whether the policy was a tax or a sub-
sidy. The tax would reduce the gross margin to
$62,983, while the biological nitrogen tax credit or
the rotation payment would increase farm gross
margin to $69,155 or $69,237, respectively.
If the IFMPO allowed wheat harvest, that pro-
gram would still not enter the optimal enterprise
mix in this farm model. However, if forced into
the solution, the wheaticlover crop mix would en-
ter (in lieu of the oat/clover mix under the current
program). The marginal cost per acre would drop
to $20.94/acre, and leaching would be 10,011 lbs/
acre. This would be less financially damaging than
adoption of the current IFMPO program, but it
would also lead to more leaching.
If the commodity programs with their associated
restrictions on beneficiary crops and deficiency
payments were eliminated, the optimal enterprise
mix would be pure soybeansl, for a farm gross
1This result is admittedlyrmrealktic, since few producerswould care
to rely entirely on a single crop. It results fromthe desire to modelpolicy
effects as simply as possible. The only resources constrained are land
margin of $62,208, as shown in column 3 of Table
3. Because soybean tends to use up existing soil
nitrogen and then fixes most of its supplementary
nitrogen needs, nitrate leaching would be low,
only 4,000 lbs total. If, in the absence of other
commodity programs, a $28 per acre rotation
credit were offered, then the farm gross margin
would be maximized by raising a corn-corn-
soybean-wheat/clover rotation on 182.2 acres, as
shown in the last column of Table 3. This would
generate an annual gross margin of $62,230, but
would raise nitrate leaching to 7,273 lbs. A
slightly higher rotation credit of $29/acre would
induce all land to move to the CCSW/Cl rotation
with 13,000 lbs/acre of nitrate leaching. Clearly, a
rotation credit can have the undesired effect of in-
creasing leachate by replacing soybeans with crops
that are more prone to inefficient nitrogen uptake
and higher fertilizer nitrogen requirements.
The least costly means to reduce nitrate leaching
while retaining the feed grains program can be
found by parametrically restricting the amount of
leaching allowed. These results are presented in
Table 4, As leachate is restricted from 10,906 to
4,000 lbs, high yield corn and the associated crops
on com base land are systematically substituted by
soybeans outside the government program. At the
and seasonal labor availability. This enterprise mix is stable up to a com
price of $2.28/bushel, above which level the optimat solu(ions would
switch to a mix of soybeans and high-yield corn, switching entirely to
com above a com price of $2.32/bushel. However, such a com price
would be on the high side of tbe historic corn-soybean price ratio for a
soybean price of $5.60,Swinton and Clark Policy Approaches to Reduce Nitrate Leaching 71
Table 4. Parametric Programming Results of
Increasing the Restriction on Maximum
Nitrate Leachbw Under FACTA
Maximum Permissible
Nitrate Leachate (lbs)
Activities 10,906 4,000 2,300 300
Gross margin ($) 69,112 62,208 51,838 19,534
-----------------Acres -----------------
Corn base acres
High yield com in
CS rotation 187.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
0/92 Fallow 0.0 0.0 187,5 187.5
Flex soybean 37.5 0.0 37.5 37.5
Set-aside 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0
Non-base acres
Soybean in CS rotation 187.5 0.0 0,0 0.0
Soybean (continuous) 62.5 500.0 250,0 0.0
4,0001b leachate level, the marginal value of an
acre of corn base land is zero, as compared with
$26.60 with no restriction. From that level down to
2,300 lbs of leachate, 0/92 fallow, normal flex
soybeans and set-aside replace non-program soy-
beans on com base acres, which begin to have
value again. From 2,300 to 300 lbs of Ieachate,
soybeans grown outside the corn base are system-
atically replaced with fallow, and the marginal
value of land is zero. Finally, below 300 lbs of
leachate, the corn base land is fallowed. In the
absence of the commodity program, reducing the
permissible level of nitrate leaching below 4,000
lbs simply leads to the fallowing of soybean land.
Sensitivity analysis of the nitrogen tax, biolog-
ical nitrogen tax credit, and rotation payment pol-
icies revealed their solutions to be very stable
around the enterprise mix in column 2 of Table 3,
Between the 121% and 780% levels, the nitrogen
input tax enterprise mix remains unchanged (al-
though, of course, gross margin declines as the tax
rises). That mix is also stable for a biological ni-
Table 5. Estimated Marginal Private and
Social Costs Per Pound of Reduced Nitrate
Leaching Under FACTA (Based on Results of
Parametric Leachate Prozrammimz)
Change in Nitrate Leaching (Ibs)
10,906 4,000 2,300 300
Policy Alternative to 4,000 to 2,300 to 300 to o
-----------------Dollars -----------------
Marginal private cost 1.00 6.10 16,15 65.11
Marginal private plus
government cost – 1.35 14.87 16.15 15.43
trogen tax credit between 163% and 40070, as well
as a rotation payment at any level above $24/acre.
E@ciency of Alternative Policies 10Reduce
Nitrate Leaching
The welfare effects of the policies proposed above
vary sharply from one to another. Under the nitro-
gen tax, the producer bears all the costs of leachate
reduction, while the government obtains tax reve-
nues (which might be used to cover costs of that
leaching which still occurs). Under the rotation
payment scheme, the producer is fully compen-
sated for changing his or her system, and the costs
of leachate reduction are borne by taxpayers. How-
ever, the net effect on taxpayers is ameliorated
somewhat by the fact that the rotation payment
supplants the deficiency payment on com base
acres. While the distributional effects of policy al-
ternatives are central to political debate, the federal
budget deficit makes program costs especially im-
portant.
Distributional impacts aside, these policies
should also be evaluated according to their effi-
ciency at reaching desired goals in nitrate leaching
reduction. The results presented above provide the
basis for a static approximation of the marginal
private cost (MPC) per pound of leachate reduction
as the change in gross margin divided by the
change in leachate levels. More relevant for policy
purposes, however, is to a measure marginal pri-
vate plus government cost (MPGC) per pound of
nitrate leaching reduction by factoring in govern-
ment costs and revenues as well. MPGC is as fol-
lows:
ACM + ATax – APayments
MPGC =
ALeachate
where GM is gross margin, Tax is government tax
revenues, Payments is government payments,
Leachate is nitrate leached, and A denotes change
from one level to another. This measure of MPGC
is limited in that 1) it omits health and environ-
mental costs, and 2) the linearity of the denomi-
nator implies that the marginal value of leachate
reduction to society does not change from the first
unit to the last. In spite of these limitations, this
MPGC measure represents an improvement on
marginal private cost alone.
The most striking difference between estimated
private and social marginal costs is that of reducing
leachate to 4,000 lbs/acre. Table 4 shows that
while under FACTA such a reduction would incur
private costs of $1.00 per pound of nitrate leaching
reduction (as land switched out of the government72 April 1994 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
com program to continuous soybean), the switch
would actually generate a net social gain of $1.35/
lb. Further leachate reduction below 4,000 lbs ni-
trate/acre causes both MPC’s and MPGC’S to rise
at much higher rates. As expected, the marginal
private cost of leachate reduction rises at an in-
creasing rate.
By comparison with eliminating the commodity
program, none of the other policies examined is
comparably cost-effective. First, the nitrogen input
tax, the biological nitrogen tax credit, and the ro-
tation payment all resulted in a whole-farm leach-
ate reduction of only 356 lbs. Second, and partly
due to this small magnitude, the MPGC per pound
of leachate reduction was $12.30 in all three in-
stances. The private marginal cost ranged from
$17.20 for the tax to marginal gains of 0.12 and
0.35 per pound under the biological nitrogen credit
and rotation payment, respectively. Obligatory
IFMPO would appear to be a more efficient ap-
proach. Under this policy alternative the MPC and
MPGC are equal at $1.87/lb leachate over the range
10,906 to 9,211 lbs. If IFMPO were obligatory but
wheat harvest were permitted, the marginal costs
of leachate reduction would fall further to $1. 17/lb
over the range from 10,906 to 10,011 lbs.
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
This paper has explored alternative policies to at-
tain a goal of reduced nitrate leaching under con-
ditions typical of a southern Michigan cash grain
farm. The results are indicative only, and are lim-
ited by the specification of technical parameters
and price/cost relationships. They are also limited
to what might be termed “first-round” effects
(Helmers et al.), since they would have major gen-
eral equilibrium effects which would alter future
relative prices. However, they illustrate that a pub-
lic program not designed for that purpose does not
provide financial incentives for farmers to reduc-
ing nitrate leaching from row crops.
Under the current federal commodity programs
of the 1990 FACTA, resource-conserving crops do
not enter the most profitable enterprise mix. While
taxing leachate is demonstratably the most effi-
cient solution in the absence of administrative
transactions costs (e.g., Johnson, Adams and
Perry), these are widely recognized to be high
enough that making such an effluent tax is imprac-
ticable. The marginal private plus government cost
estimates suggest that eliminating the current com-
modity program is the most efficient second-best
means to reduce nitrate leaching. Surprisingly, this
is true from both a private and a government per-
spective (financial only) in the case examined.
The marginal private plus government cost esti-
mates beg a marginal social benefit measure for
comparison, While numerous studies exist on the
costs of agricultural pollution reduction measures
(Clark; Helmers et al.; Helmers and Wehrman;
Johnson, Adams and Perry; Williams and Diebel),
comparable benefit valuation studies are not avail-
able. Indeed, only Poe and Bishop have addressed
the subject. Where marginal private benefits of ni-
trate leaching reduction are perceived, there is po-
tential for voluntary reductions in nitrogen use.
However, major research advances are needed on
the valuation of benefits from reduced health risk
due to groundwater contaminants.
A simpler approach to voluntary reduction of
nitrate leaching is by soil and tissue sample testing
to improve the timing of nitrogen applications.
Babcock and Blackmer have demonstrated that soil
nitrate test information can significantly increase
profits and reduce nitrogen quantities applied to
Iowa corn (and hence subsequent nitrate leaching).
If they become commercially available, more rapid
tissue sample nitrogen tests might allow nitrogen
sidedress fertilization to be even more carefully
calibrated to plant needs.
An important extension of the research pre-
sented here is to incorporate financial risk manage-
ment into a model of the interaction between the
commodity programs and nitrate leaching. Finan-
cial risk management has been demonstrated to
rationalize farm program participation by risk
averse producers using quadratic programming
(Scott and Baker) and MOTAD models (Olson and
Eidman). Risk aversion may also justify heavy ni-
trogen fertilization (Babcock). It could reasonably
be expected that for a risk averse producer, the
difference between the private expected utility of
net income with and without deficiency payments
would be smaller than that calculated here for a
risk averse producer. Another useful extension
would be to incorporate nitrate leaching dynamics,
either in a multiperiod LP (see Gillespie, Hatch
and Duffy; Mires, Duffy and Young), or else by
linking a LP model to a simulation model (e.g.,
Faeth; Johnson, Adams and Perry; Taylor, Adams
and Miller).
An important research gap exists on the bio-
physical side in predicting optimal timing of nitro-
gen amendments and in understanding nitrogen
movement in the soil under alternative vegetative
covers, The work of Harwood and his associates
suggests that crop diversity (including cover crops)
has the potential to reduce erosion and leaching by
improving nitrogen uptake during the crop season
and immobilizing soil nitrogen during the off-
season. The research on soil nitrogen dynamicsSwinton and Clark Policy Approaches to Reduce Nitrate Leaching 73
needed to test this hypothesis could provide the
data base for a more sophisticated and realistic
model of farmer nitrogen management. Moreover,
if the Harwood hypothesis can be substantiated in
the form of crop and soil fertility management rec-
ommendations, important reductions in nitrate
leaching and runoff may be obtained by education-
al efforts. Such crop management innovations
could reduce the cost of commodity program in-
centives based on such environmental criteria as
reductions in erosion or leaching of agricultural
chemicals.
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